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Abstract
Starting with the premise that modern western notions of good governance may be 
misdirected within a context of traditional Asian civil societies, this article investigates third 
sector governance practices in Southeast Asia. Case studies from different data sources 
are presented to suggest that there is no one ideal form of governance or accountability in 
Southeast Asian third sector organisations. Applying a western lens can serve to deflect 
attention away from the ways in which contextual factors affect the thinking and practices 
of accountability of local actors. The paper concludes that a process of hybridisation in 
governance models is taking place in Southeast Asian societies.
Keywords
Governance; Third Sector; Asia
DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTEREST The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the 
research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. FUNDING The contribution of Louise Coventry is supported by an 
Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.Coventry’s research also received support from ActionAid 
International, ActionAid Cambodia, ActionAid Denmark and Cord.Research in Indonesia was funded through an Australian 
Research Council Discovery Grant: Capacity -building in Indonesian Islamic NGOs.
1
2  Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 
 
Introduction 
Academics give very little serious consideration to the question of how best to govern non-
profit/third sector organisations in Asia. While much of the discussion of third sector 
governance can be located in the bifurcated discourse which distinguishes between the 
‘global South’ and the ‘global North’, it nevertheless assumes that the western corporate 
governance model should be adopted, regardless of how appropriate that may be in different 
contexts. Focussing on accountability practices, this paper challenges this assumption and 
explores current moves to more nuanced and contextually appropriate hybrid models of 
governance. 
In a recent article, David Lewis (2015) contests what he calls ‘parallel worlds ’in third 
sector discourse. The parallel worlds are expressed in the binary terminology of non-
governmental organisations for international third sector organisations and non-profit or 
voluntary organisations for those in (western) domestic settings. This terminology is overlaid 
on the historical bifurcation of ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ societies, which frames so-
called developing societies as the Other to the developed western ones. Lewis points out the 
ideological and simplistic nature of these distinctions. His resolution is to develop a more 
unified approach to third sector research. Yet a unified approach which is non-contextualised 
risks sliding back into the dominant and privileged western framework, which has been so 
lambasted by the critics of western neo-colonialism (for example Latouche, 1993; Escobar, 
1995; Kothari, 1998; Sachs, 2010) and which falls prey to the assumption that western 
models of governance (and accountability) offer the best ways of structuring third sector 
organisations. 
Indeed, third sector research and literature are replete with concepts that originate in 
western, and in particular Anglophone, countries, which are applied in studies of the third 
sector in very different parts of the globe. Furthermore, assumptions about the global 
relevance and applicability of western concepts are not only found in academic studies, but 
also in practices in the international development industry, with significant implications. Yet 
even in the ‘west’, concepts and practices of governance are often contested.  
This paper proceeds with an overview of the concepts of governance and accountability 
as variously provided in the academic third sector literature. Then follows an outline of three 
distinct models of governance previously identified in an empirical study of some 500 Asian 
non-profit organisations, each of which adopts a different approach to governance and 
accountability (Hasan and Onyx, 2008). This leads to a discussion tracing hybridity within 
the Southeast Asian context. The discussion draws on three recent case studies as exemplars 
of more nuanced and hybrid forms of governance and accountability. Then, attention is 
drawn to the processes of hybridisation in governance models that are occurring in Southeast 
Asian societies, as imported models are adapted to each specific context. 
Governance of third sector organisations 
Perrow (2001) makes a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ non-profit organisations. An 
organisation is only ‘good’ to the extent that it contributes to civil society. To achieve quality 
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outcomes, organisations need to be well-governed. Yet what constitutes effective governance 
is far from clear, unambiguous and widely agreed. In fact, there are quite different ideas 
about what third sector governance, or effective governance, means. Governance itself refers 
to the rule of law, the exercise of authority. Exactly how authority is exercised may vary 
widely. However, all organisations need to address some common principles of effective 
governance: 
• A means for identifying the goals and future direction of the organisation 
• A means for making specific action-oriented decisions 
• A means of implementing decisions 
• A means of accountability for those decisions and actions. 
But effective governance should do more than that in a civil society context. Effective 
governance can facilitate the development of inclusive networks of mutual support within the 
community. As research over the past 20 years has demonstrated, civil society organisations 
are ideally placed to build social capital, particularly at the local level (Onyx and Bullen, 
2000). 
Accountability is seen as central to the practice of effective governance. Accountability 
is the state of being called to account, to provide an explanation or justification for one’s 
conduct or duties especially, but not only, for the appropriate and lawful use of finance. But 
this raises the question to whom is the organisation accountable, and for what? (Ebrahim, 
2010; Stein, 2008). And further, how is this accountability to be demonstrated, and what 
compliance mechanisms are available and necessary to ensure that the organisation remains 
within its accepted zone of conduct? Governance models must address these questions.  
Three models of governance 
The three existing models of governance found in Hasan and Onyx’s (2008) study of 500 
Asian organisations each apply a different solution to the decision-making processes of 
governance and each demonstrates a different form of accountability.  
The three models are the ‘corporate governance model’, the ‘traditional model or 
patron-client model’ and the ‘democratic or community development model’. These 
approaches were outlined in detail in Onyx (2008) and are reproduced here as the basis of a 
follow-up analysis. 
The corporate governance model is the so-called ‘modern’ approach of the corporate world 
of business. In borrowing from the world of business it assumes that an organisation is 
managed by a board. It refers to the capacity of the board and management to drive the 
organisation (usually understood as a company) forward within a framework of ‘effective 
accountability’. Within the corporate model of governance, ‘it is the task of the board of 
management to set the mission of the organisation, and to determine the broad strategic 
direction that the organisation is to take’ (Onyx, 2008, p.105). This model assumes that the 
organisation is performing a set of actions on behalf of stakeholders, such as an external set 
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of shareholders, and has a chief executive officer (CEO) who is accountable to the board for 
the successful operationalisation of strategic directions. 
Brown et al. (2003) identify three quite different forms of accountability relationships 
within third sector organisations (being bureaucratic, moral/indirect and personal/relational). 
The principal/agent relationship subordinates the interests of the agent to that of the principal 
who has the legal, economic and perhaps moral right to demand an account from the agent. 
This is the typical form of bureaucratic accountability normally imposed by a funding body. 
Under this form of accountability, the agent (third sector organisation) must comply with 
demands from the principal, but need not necessarily report to its own constituency. In the 
Asian context, those organisations seeking formal/ legal registration and/or foreign funding, 
will attempt to conform to the demands of this accountability relationship. This occurs at two 
levels simultaneously. In orienting to the donor’s requirement, the organisation positions 
itself as the agent in relation to the donor (or the principal). But in accepting the donor 
requirement to establish a board, the organisation perpetuates, mirrors and reinvents the 
principal-agent relationship in its own context. 
Systems of command and control are established to ensure the correct implementation 
of decisions. The manager uses scientific principles to establish management techniques. 
Work follows formal procedures and rules, all of which are documented in strategic plans, 
budgets, procedure manuals, job specifications, annual reports and so on. Accountability is 
formal and follows the line of authority upwards. That is, those whose task it is to implement 
the decisions must report to middle management, who in turn must report to the general 
manager or CEO. He or she in turn must report to the board, who must report to the 
shareholders. The CEO and management team are then tasked with the daily operations of the 
organisation, including the financial management of resources. For this they are held to 
account by the board within the principal-agent relationship. It is essential that the board 
remain independent from the management if they are to take the monitoring role seriously 
(Onyx, 2008; Ebrahim, 2003). The board must hold management to account without 
engaging in the daily management of the organisation. If relations between board and 
management are too close, then it is unlikely that the board can carry out its duties of 
surveillance or hold management to account. Within the corporate governance model, the 
organisation’s members or clients/ customers have minimal input into the decision-making 
process. Such organisations have little opportunity to develop social capital. 
The research undertaken by Hasan and Onyx (2008) found that, overall, 87% of 
organisations examined had a board, including 94% of those who were incorporated but also 
51% of those who were not incorporated. Those incorporated and those receiving foreign 
funding were significantly more likely to follow general corporate governance protocols 
including holding regular formal board meetings with agenda and minutes recorded. They 
were not, however, likely to hold general meetings open to the public. The majority had a 
formal planning process and formal financial accounting methods. So on the face of it, it 
appeared that the majority of these third sector organisations tended to accept corporate 
governance. However, these organisations were likely to be the larger urban based ‘modern’ 
organisations and did not necessarily represent the vast majority of indigenous civil society 
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organisations, or ‘people’s organisations’. Also many of those organisations studied, while 
maintaining the outward form of the corporate governance model, in fact operated quite 
differently. 
The traditional or patron-client model of governance produced quite a different approach 
to governance. The dominant cultural values in the majority of countries studied included two 
important cultural principles: first a deep respect for and obedience to legitimate (traditional) 
authority, and second a strong commitment to maintaining smooth interpersonal relations. 
Traditional governance revolved around the patron/client relationship in which a person of 
power/ wealth and authority became the driving force and both created and led the 
organisation to meet identified social needs (Pye,1999; Smillie and Hailey, 2001). There is 
not usually a democratic election of the leader, nor an independent process of advertisement 
and selection by merit. ‘Good governance, then, involves the responsible and ethical carriage 
of authority by the elder or patron’ (Onyx, 2008, p.106). The purpose and direction of the 
organisation is usually a given; it is considered self-evident, and is based on traditional values 
and assumptions, such as maintaining a place of worship. The leader will from time to time 
re-interpret those values and organisational purpose as circumstances demand but will not be 
expected to create or change the ‘strategic direction’ of the organisation. ‘The members do 
not question the direction of the leader, but rather seek to contribute to the maintenance of the 
internal harmony of the organisation. In return for their loyalty, the patron or leader is 
expected to support and protect the interests of the members’ (Onyx, 2008, p.106). He 
(usually a male) must be, and be seen to be, a person of great integrity, honesty and 
compassion and dedicated to the community. The patron ultimately makes all important 
decisions about the organisation.  
‘There is not usually a direct form of accountability. The leader may be accountable to 
some higher form of authority such as God or the state. At the local level, he may be 
accountable in an implicit way to the consensus of his people. But there is usually no formal 
or written form of accountability’ (Onyx, 2008, p.106).  
Membership of the organisation is usually a given and does not change. As Vandendael 
et al. (2013) point out, many of the discussions of accountability miss the importance of local 
culture. Indeed, failure to grasp the importance of informal relationships, tradition and trust is 
a significant weakness in many of the attempts to apply western notions of accountability to 
third sector organisations in non-western societies. The weakness is exacerbated when the 
third sector organisation is a faith-based organisation. In regard to faith-based organisations, 
accountability needs to be constructed through a religious framework based on moral 
relationships.  
Religious third sector organisations play an important part in the lives of many people 
throughout Southeast Asia (Clarke, 2006). In Cambodia, for example, Buddhist beliefs are an 
intrinsic part of the culture. Pak et al. (2007), in their critical literature review of 
accountability in Cambodia, conclude that accountability in a Cambodian context is best 
understood as ‘a personal, administrative and political value which involves both a 
relationship and the mechanisms, rules and resources that enable a system to function’ (p.68). 
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This interpretation is broad and inclusive, consistent with complex, nuanced and pluralist 
ideas about accountability. In Indonesia, Islam, in particular, has a strong tradition of charity, 
such as through the practice of zakat, involving the duty of able Muslims to contribute a fixed 
portion of their income to support those in need in a local community. In this context, 
accountability is a private affair based on moral and religious obligation. This means that 
acting responsibly is an important cultural feature in Indonesia and something individuals 
should aspire to in their daily life and in their dealings with others. 
The democratic model of governance as noted in Onyx (2008, p.106) ‘requires a form of 
governance that involves the people, or members of the organisation in an open and 
participatory manner’. The principles and practice of community development (McArdle, 
1989; Kenny, 2017) can be articulated as: 
• Decision-making by those most affected by outcomes of the decision: the 
subsidiarity principle 
• Personal empowerment and control by individual citizens over their own life: 
the empowerment principle 
• The development of ongoing structures and processes by which groups can 
meet their own needs: the structural principle. 
A democratic form of governance requires some form of consensus of equals and 
transparency of process. While it is often held as an ideal, the actual mechanisms by which 
decision-making can genuinely occur in this way is much more difficult to achieve. The 
requirements of effective governance concern the genuine participation of all stakeholders in 
decision-making, including the setting of the organisational goals and strategic direction, a 
process of carrying out the decisions that is effective and empowering for the members, and a 
form of accountability that is open and visible to all. The emphasis at all levels is on 
inclusivity (Onyx, 2008, pp.106-7). 
If the organisation is small enough, then it may be possible for all decisions to be made 
by consensus, as in a collective. This may happen in small village organisations. However, 
consensus becomes cumbersome and ineffective once the organisation becomes large and 
complex. Some sort of representative selection of core decision makers may be used, perhaps 
with broad principles being endorsed through general meetings. Key stakeholders may be 
represented on smaller committees or action groups (Onyx, 2008, pp106-7).  
‘The challenge of good governance within the participatory democratic model is to 
establish processes which genuinely empower the individual and which mobilise social 
capital itself’ (Onyx, 2008, p.107).  
Important processes include the provision of appropriate information, so that all 
participants can make informed decisions, the recognition and mobilisation of local 
knowledge and engaging practical commitment among local communities. Perhaps more 
important than any pre-existing community resources, are those new solutions that may be 
generated by the combined creative energies of the contributing parties. Out of this creative 
engagement, new solutions can emerge. 
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Onyx (2008) points out that the participatory democratic organisation must also 
develop appropriate methods of accountability. Bureaucratic forms of line accountability will 
not suffice. This form of accountability relationship, according to Brown et al. (2003), entails 
a mutual relationship of equal trust, respect and influence, which involves a broad general 
commitment, usually based on the informal, moral suasion of peer networks. This kind of 
accountability is based on a commitment to shared values, flexible operations and extensive 
stocks of social capital (Onyx and Bullen, 2000). Accountability mechanisms need to be 
consistent with the principles of participatory democracy itself, that is, transparent and open 
and understandable to all. Like social capital, the mechanisms will foster trust, participation 
in networks and social agency. What is required is the accountability of transparency. In the 
democratic model of governance, this is ‘a kind of communal accountability, not directed 
upwards to the controlling sponsor or patron, but a generalised accountability to all interested 
parties, including in particular the constituent community, and the organisation’s members’ 
(Onyx, 2008, p.107). Such a practical form of transparent accounting meets the requirements 
of public reporting of the disbursement of public funds. It does so without secrecy or 
coercion. All stakeholders have access to what should be common information. Malpractice 
made public is very difficult to maintain. However, this model is not necessarily compatible 
with hierarchical structures typically found in Asian societies. 
Hybridity 
Hybridity in the context of this paper refers to the situation where a non-profit/ third sector 
organisation modifies a particular governance model to better suit the sociocultural context in 
which it occurs. To illustrate hybrid forms of organisational governance, theoretical 
perspectives of hybridity are considered from two angles: hybridity in intercultural terms and 
hybridity in organisational forms.  
In an increasingly post-western world, there is ‘abundant evidence of the interplay and 
mutual influence of different cultural approaches to order’ (Wesley, 2018, p. ix). One 
approach to understanding this interplay and mutual influence is based on the concept of 
hybridity meaning a mixture of different elements. This approach is hardly novel. Complex, 
dynamic enmeshments across difference and frictions and transformations across struggles 
for power are age-old phenomenon (Brown, 2018). Negotiating difference seems ‘likely to be 
a fundamental and potentially creative part of collective human experience and activity, 
across millennia of migrations, trade, wars, occupations and marriages’ (Brown, 2018, p.23). 
However, it is also often deeply challenging, imposed/unchosen and violent.  
Hybridity in organisational form is already apparent in the borrowing of ‘corporate 
governance’ models from the business world for application in non-profit/ third sector 
organisations. Forms of governance which blend elements of two or more of the more 
conventional models include, for example, an organisation which approximates the traditional 
or patron-client model and which may have a single strong founder but also a board of 
directors in order to meet foreign funding requirements. Another example would be where a 
communal form of accountability is used alongside a semi hierarchical decision structure. Or 
where an organisation is established using one form of governance, but then begins to 
8 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 
 
incorporate aspects of another form. The original study of different models of governance in 
Asia (Hasan and Onyx, 2008) found many examples of organisations which appeared to 
conform to the corporate governance model, but in which the board maintained a close 
supportive relationship with the CEO and there was no suggestion of the board maintaining 
an independent position or in any way challenging the actions of the staff; to do so would 
violate strong cultural norms of maintaining smooth interpersonal relationships.  
Some practical cases 
One recently reported case that approximates the community development model is that of 
Remexio, an international collaboration to reduce energy poverty in Timor-Leste (Keevers, 
2017). This international project introduced clean, affordable sustainable solar lighting to 
several villages where there previously had been only dangerous and inadequate kerosene 
lighting. The project involved the training of local technicians in the assembly, installation, 
maintenance and repair of lighting systems as well as the formation of local committees to 
manage the ‘common funds’. Each household contributed a minimum sum each month to the 
common fund to maintain the system. The international partners were local citizens living in 
a rural valley in Australia. They played a facilitative and training role but had no direct 
influence on local decision-making. What transpired was that not only was the sustainable 
lighting transformational for the local village, but the common fund created surplus value 
which could then be used by the village to create new collective ventures. Throughout the 
project, decision-making involved the whole village in the selection of trainee technicians, 
and the local committee members, as well as in the use of surplus common funds. Decisions 
took place in the presence of those who bore their consequences. Accountability was always 
inside the multidirectional relationships of the village. The system like this requires ongoing 
work and diligence by the village committee, to keep records, maintain the system, enable the 
fund to grow and ensure ongoing accountabilities between all members of the scheme. In this 
respect the management committee is gradually adopting some of the procedural techniques 
of corporate governance. 
In Indonesia there are many examples of relatively effective governance using the 
traditional or patron/client model1. This traditional approach to governance can be found in a 
number of grassroots organisations, particularly evident in Islamic organisations that are 
linked with pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). A clear example of the importance of 
tradition has been discernible in rural areas, where under the leadership of local Kyai (a 
respected religious leader and teacher) students and local farmers have worked together on 
small farming production that has benefitted both the farmers and the pesantren. Here the 
Kyai, as a man of integrity, has a personal relationship with both students and villagers. He is 
trusted to act in the interest of students and villagers alike.  
The importance of person to person contact and community to community contact as 
the basis of support for those in need was also clearly evident in case-studies of Islamic 
organisations involved in the reconstruction of post-tsunami Aceh. In (western) assessments 
of the overall costs of reconstruction it was difficult to calculate the contributions of Islamic 
                                                          
1 Examples from Indonesia are drawn from research completed by Sue Kenny and Ismet Fanany.  
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organisations because there were few formally based accountability systems that had any 
resonance in western accountability practices. Interestingly, in Aceh, when researchers 
introduced the topic of accountability, they were referred to the simple accountability system 
required by the Saudi government in regard to their contribution to the rebuilding of Aceh. 
For example, in relation to funding provided for the rebuilding of a mosque, all that was 
required was a photo of the new mosque. Such a practical approach was found in other 
contexts, expressed in the comment that what is really important is to be able to see that an 
NGO project exists and there is agreement amongst the beneficiaries that it has actually 
helped the people. Soliciting for funds to extend or enhance a mosque is common in 
Indonesia. However, it is very unusual for a community or contributor to ask the mosque 
construction committee to see the accounts and/or receipts, and there is no process for 
auditing expenditure. Such a request would be considered inappropriate and insulting. 
One West Sumatran proverb says that when you entrust someone with something, you 
should not scrutinise the conduct of the person in doing the task entrusted to them: Pitaruah 
jan diunian ‘You should not watch over something (you have entrusted to someone)’. It does 
happen, however, that very occasionally a community or a donor may request a more formal 
accounting of expenses, such as documents and receipts, if they suspect that the entrusted 
individual or committee has behaved inappropriately such as by misusing funds. Even under 
these circumstances, extreme care must be taken and the reasons for such a request must be 
very strong because the request alone, regardless of outcome, will have already damaged the 
reputation of the individual or committee by calling their integrity into question. In a sense, 
the community will view the individual or committee as having ‘failed the test’. At the same 
time, whether leaders decide to respond to requests for the details of an action is at their 
discretion.   
Some particularly interesting cases emerged during research in Cambodia2. Here a 
group of committed NGO board members and managers sought to enhance the governance 
capacity of their organisations. All identified a preference for adhering to the corporate 
governance model, if only they could learn how to make it operate effectively. However, in 
practice they were constantly confronted by the realities of patrimonial models at play. 
Within Cambodian society in general and NGOs in particular, hierarchy is extremely 
important. This is consistent with a focus on patron-client relationships, as described above. 
Local researchers discussed the concept of ‘face’ at length: Losing face and saving face are 
important cultural considerations in Cambodia (Ty et al., 2010). Attention to one’s position in 
a hierarchical society means simultaneously avoiding challenging those with higher status 
and not accepting the ideas of those with lower status. Thus, the chairperson’s face can be 
protected by not challenging him (or her) and by avoiding expressing ideas. Chairpersons, for 
their part, may not want to accept the ideas of members who hold lower position and may feel 
anxious that others’ ideas are better than his/her own. The assumption is that the chairperson 
will have higher capacity than other board members and can be entrusted to make decisions 
on behalf of all board members. This is especially so if the position of chairperson is filled 
                                                          
2 One of authors of this paper, Louise Coventry, is finalising her doctoral research into NGO governance in 
Cambodia. See Coventry (forthcoming).  
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through a popular election, in which other board members participate. Board members will 
rely on the chair: ‘In reality, when they make decision, the chairperson has more power’. In 
Cambodian culture, leadership … ‘it’s not to serve the people, the people to serve the leader’ 
(Coventry, forthcoming). 
The consequence of these practices that privilege relationships over rules, as identified 
by the Cambodian researchers, was that some malpractices would likely occur; that is, 
malpractice at least as seen through expatriate eyes. Instances were identified where ‘some 
people on the board just go and agree with the director’ and directors (are) removing board 
members who don’t agree with them … and changing the board or vice versa: ‘Like this 
board member who chased the director out and then become the director himself. And then 
people who are on the board who did not agree with them, he just chased them away’ 
(Coventry, forthcoming).  
Tracing hybridity in governance 
Two things are suggested from the case studies above. The first is that the corporate 
governance model, as intended, rarely works within the cultural specificity of these Asian 
cultural contexts. The second is that researchers and practitioners alike are modifying the 
model in more culturally appropriate ways while seeking to avoid falling into deeper 
problems of malpractice and inadequate accountability. 
What is becoming evident is that there are now different and shifting configurations of 
governance models. For example, what seems to be happening in the third sector in Indonesia 
is that although western governance models still have heuristic value, they are beginning to 
overlap with local ideas and practices of governance. That is, different third sector 
organisations, and even different projects within one third sector organisation, operate 
through different governance and accountability processes, depending on both internal and 
external contexts.  
Overall, then, in research into accountability processes in Asian third sector 
organisations, while there is frequently no formal concept of accountability in the governance 
process, there is an implicit understanding of the complex multi-dimensional lines of 
accountability. These multi-dimensional practices include casual and formal reporting 
mechanisms, but are also based on tradition, personal integrity and standing in the 
community as well as trust and mutuality (Onyx, 2008, p.106). This indicates a process of 
hybridisation. 
Re-examining hybridisation 
A multiplicity of outcomes can occur when two entities – or two sets of conceptual tools – 
meet and interact. This is also apparent when considering an analysis of hybridity within the 
third sector.Hybrids may be formal or informal institutional arrangements of overlapping 
sectoral segments and/or combinations of governance mechanisms (Seibel, 2015). Much of 
the analysis of hybridity within the third sector focusses on hybridity between the dominant 
sectors of the state (public sector), the market (private business sector), and civil society 
(third sector), for example the growing interest in social enterprises which contain elements 
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of both the market and the third sector (Billis, 2010; Ebrahim, Battilana and Mair, 2014). 
However, hybridity may also occur through the overlap or combinations of governance 
mechanisms within the organisation. 
Billis (2010) provides a comprehensive ‘map’ of all possible combinations between the 
three dominant, non-hybrid sectors. He identifies five core elements that need to be clarified 
in specifying any organisation, being the definition of ownership of the organisation, the form 
of governance, operational priorities, distinctive human resources, and distinctive other 
(financial) resources. So, for example the core private sector principles identify ownership by 
shareholders; while in the public sector, ownership is by citizens through public elections; 
and in the third sector ownership is by members and participants. Operational priorities for 
private sector organisations are based on market forces and individual choice; operational 
principles for public sector organisations are public service and collective choice; while 
operational principles for third sector organisations involve commitment to a distinctive 
mission. Similarly, each sector is characterised by a distinctive form of financial and human 
resourcing (Billis, 2010, p.55). Hybrids may contain elements from two or more sectors, 
either in combination, or synergy, or separated within the same organisation. 
In order to understand how hybrids arise or what forms they take, Skelcher and Rathgeb 
Smith (2014) use an institutional logics approach to theorise hybrids as entities that face a 
plurality of normative frames. The theoretical basis of this is taken from Friedland and Alford 
(1991, pp.248-49): 
Each of the most important orders of …society has a central logic - a set of 
material practices and symbolic constructions - which constitutes its organizing 
principles and which is available to organisations and individuals to 
elaborate…these institutional logics are symbolically grounded, organizationally 
structured, politically defended and technically and materially constrained, and 
hence have specific historical limits. 
Each sector has its archetypal logic or rationality These logics are expressed through their 
distinctive and ideal-typical sources of legitimacy, authority, and identity. Skelcher and 
Rathgeb Smith (2014) identify the following institutional orders, each with their distinctive 
logic. They are the family, community, religion, the state, the market, and the professions. So 
for instance, the source of legitimacy for the family is unconditional loyalty, its authority is 
patriarchal, and its source of identity is reputation. By contrast, for religion the source of 
legitimacy is faith and sacredness, the source of authority is the priesthood and/or charisma, 
and the source of identity is association with deities. The community derives its legitimacy 
from unity of will, trust and reciprocity, authority involves a commitment to community 
values, and identity derives from emotional connection (Skelcher and Rathgeb Smith, 2014). 
Individual agency is important, but ‘we have a world of situated actors whose agency is 
enabled and constrained by the prevailing institutional logics, and who creatively respond by 
adapting organisational forms in order to better fit a complex institutional environment’ 
(p.437-439). Thus, institutional logics have both material and cultural or symbolic 
components.A similar approach is found in the study of emergence which may consist of the 
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creative recombination of separate elements. This is a seen as a method of innovation 
involving bricolage (Baker, Onyx and Edwards, 2011). 
While each institutional logic is largely internally consistent, each is fundamentally 
distinct, such that the underlying principles may be incompatible with the logic of other 
institutional forms, sometimes rendering one non-commensurate with another. For example, 
the authority of the state being bureaucratic domination, or the rule of law, may be non-
commensurate with the religious authority of the priesthood or the patriarchal authority of the 
family. When any two of these institutional logics are brought together in a hybrid form of 
organisation, the resulting broad organisational form is likely to experience some tension. For 
example, Ebrahim et al. (2014) explore the potential mission drift and accountability 
challenges in social enterprises. 
The resolution of contradictions between institutional logics may be far greater when 
seen in the context of quite different cultural contexts; hybridity in intercultural terms adds a 
layer of complexity to hybridity in institutional terms. Within postcolonial studies, hybridity 
is used, albeit controversially, as a conceptual tool to help ‘understand complex processes of 
socio-political interaction and relationships between colonial powers and colonised subjects’ 
(Kent et al., 2018, p.1). Bhabha’s foundational work on hybridity emphasises resistance to 
domination and the agential power of the colonised or subaltern subjects (Bhabha, 1994). 
Resistance may manifest itself in outright violence, active reform of introduced practices, 
and/or co-optation. Routley (2016) coins the term ‘grey practices’ to refer to the ways in 
which NGOs pragmatically negotiate and performatively produce connections to the local 
and international in different contexts. Research reported here also identifies grey practices; it 
shows that co-optation of different models of governance, complete with their different 
epistemologies and logics, is common but also often implicit, subtle and partial. 
Critiques of hybridity focus on the paradoxical ways in which the concept of hybridity 
can reinscribe the problematic binaries it seeks to overcome. Hybridity assumes that there are 
discrete phenomena to begin with, and slides over the issue of how discrete categories are 
constructed in attempts to analyse phenomena. In other words, hybridity is based on 
essentialising different phenomena. Moreover, most theorising of hybrids across sectors or 
institutions has occurred within a western cultural context. Discussing hybridity in terms of 
the relationship between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ or between ‘western’ and ‘Asian’, for 
example, can perpetuate unhelpful binaries, homogenise categories, oversimplify complex 
contexts and milieus, and essentialise local (and international) groupings. Using a hybridity 
lens reminds us that categories are the site of contestation and negotiation, yet also stresses 
the fluidity within and between categories. Local practices are never static; they are 
constantly evolving (Ojendal and Kim, 2006), particularly when encountering the forces of 
intervention and globalisation. 
The examples below illustrate the complexity of hybridity – and the defiance of 
institutional logics – as viewed through the dual lens of organisational form and 
interculturality. 
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In Cambodia, NGOs navigate the competing demands of international donors and local 
political constraints with resilience and creativity (Coventry, 2017). Western donors provide 
finance within normative expectations of rational, legal-bureaucratic processes that see the 
role of NGOs as holding the state to account. However, the local political institutional logic is 
suspicious of social accountability processes; instead, personalised approaches, loyalty and 
reciprocity and avoidance of rights-based language are required in order to avoid being 
perceived as ‘oppositional’. 
An example of hybridisation in Indonesia can be found in the professionalisation of 
LAZs, or Lembarga Amil Zakat agencies. LAZs have traditionally been non-state zakat 
agencies. Traditionally the organisation of zakat is a private affair in which accountability is 
based on moral and religious obligation. However, the passing of the Zakat Management Law 
in 2011 opened the way for more state involvement in Islamic philanthropic activities. While 
LAZs continue to be based on individual obligation, many are now embracing elements of 
western ideas of accountability, such as the publication of annual reports, while remaining 
committed to traditional Islamic moral and religious principles.  
The situation in Vietnam is especially interesting when viewed through the lens of 
hybridity. Uniquely in global terms, civil society cannot be understood as separate from the 
state (Nørlund, 2007), but rather an extension of it. Wischermann (2010) found, regarding 
‘internal decision-making processes, most if not all Vietnamese Civic Organizations’ 
representatives’ bodies of thought and practices disclose patterns of authoritarian political 
thinking’ (p.35), matching the mode of rulership adopted by the Vietnam Communist Party.  
The three examples above use ‘hybridity’ in a descriptive sense, rather than 
prescriptively or instrumentally (Brown, 2017, 2018). In this sense, hybridity simply marks a 
recognition of the co-existence of diverse sources of order (and disorder) within the 
composition of organisational governance, without judging such co-existence to be inherently 
negative, and so opens a space to investigate the prevailing ecology of the constitutive 
relationships for governance. However, as Kent et al. (2018) observe in relation to 
‘descriptive’ hybridity, while it is a necessary starting point, a merely descriptive use of 
hybridity – describing how things are – fails to address more fundamental questions about the 
power imbalances and inequality underlying particular hybrid configurations and how these 
might be overcome. Invoking ideas of hybridity can mask underlying injustices and power 
differentials. Without sufficient attention to the power dynamics and conflictual elements in 
the specific context in question, so-called hybrid approaches can ultimately serve to 
reproduce existing patterns of hierarchy, domination and prevailing relations of power. 
Conclusions 
Mirroring Brown’s (2017, 2018) conclusion regarding the importance of dialogue for 
(hybrid) peacebuilding, more dialogical ways of seeking to understand governance that are 
grounded in ‘processes and habits of open-ended exchange’ are also recommended here. The 
art of hybridity is about crafting linkages and constructive adaption across difference, 
adaption that enables exploring and giving substance to key political goods such as justice, 
accountability, participation and social capital. And this is a shared task. 
14 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 
 
In the spirit of sharing responsibility for dialogue, this paper concludes by opening up 
several ideas and avenues for further reflection and discussion. First, understanding 
governance and accountability processes in third sector organisations per se is a daunting 
enough task in itself, but it is particularly challenging in the varied and complex societies of 
Asia. Researchers understand that accountability is a contested concept, both normatively and 
empirically. Clear examples of this contestation can be found in Asia. It would appear that 
there is no one ideal form of governance or accountability in Asian third sector organisations.  
The second reflection arises from the western framing of discussions of accountability 
in third sector organisations. While there are many different processes of accountability, the 
western lens often means skimming over the ways in which contextual factors affect the 
thinking and practices of accountability (Vandendael et al., 2013). Furthermore, the focus of 
western analyses tends to be western funded organisations, ignoring those that draw on 
resources from within a community, which are not on the radar of (the mainly western) 
researchers. And of course, western funded organisations are more likely to exhibit at least 
some elements of the western corporate model.  
From a political perspective, there is a continuing history of self-interested western 
dominance in the development arena. To counter this, the authors recommend greater 
mindfulness and deeper critical reflection to avoid applying processes that have western 
origins and inscribing them with universal validity, such as particular notions of 
accountability. Yet, alternatively ascribing these processes to neo-colonialism is overly 
simplistic. Rather than a discrete corporate governance model being forced upon traditional 
organisations, it seems that NGO development in Asia involves an agential, if subliminal, 
mixing of different models. Arguments about disjunctions between discrete models are 
difficult to sustain when models intermix and overlap.  
Third, equally problematic is the way in which the neo-colonialist argument constructs 
the people in the ‘developing’ world as passive victims of westernisation. It denies the fact 
that they have agency (Bhabha, 1994). At the same time, the neo-colonialism position tends 
to idealise traditional cultures or ‘romanticise the local’. All cultures change, including 
traditional ones (Ojendal and Kim, 2006). Not only is there a wide variety of governance and 
accountability arrangements, but these too change. For example, as part of a second wave of 
accountability (Crack, 2013), some western donors are shifting accountability requirements 
away from the emphasis on formal written reports to such mechanisms as discussion groups, 
photos and testimonials from beneficiaries (as Saudi Arabia has apparently long been doing). 
Fourth, in regard to the applicability of corporatist governance, the overall evidence in 
the research reported here is mixed. On the one hand, some embracing of some aspects of 
corporate accountability processes is observed in some locations. For example, cosmopolitan 
cities – common throughout Asia – tend to embrace modern corporate cultures more quickly, 
even if the millions of small traditional villages, with grass-roots organisations, do not. In 
other words, while corporate culture might make no sense in traditional settings, this does not 
mean that all aspects of corporate accountability are unsuited to the development of third 
sector organisations throughout Asia. On the other hand, it would seem that at this stage, 
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NGOs in general have not internalised the principles of corporatist governance. They might 
practise elements of corporatist accountability processes, but they do this for pragmatic 
reasons, such as when it is a requirement for receiving funds.  
Fifth, in regard to the community development model, while it involves discourse that 
is a western construction, at the same time many of the principles of community development 
already exist in many Asian societies, such as proclivities towards cooperation, mutual 
support and democratic decision-making. This may go hand in hand with a continuing respect 
for hierarchy and traditional authority. Community development, then, is not necessarily a 
‘new’ phenomenon in Asia. What needs to be nurtured, though, is commitment to the idea of 
collective community empowerment, based on the belief that a community itself can own and 
manage development projects, a belief that may rest uncomfortably with autocratic 
government.  
Finally, for those organisations struggling to decide whether to apply for, or accept, 
funds from external agencies, there is no clear-cut direction. At each turn there are dilemmas 
to face and work through. The authors envisage that these dilemmas will continue to change, 
as contexts alter, and governance and accountability logics shift. But these new 
configurations might just work to open up mutual learning through the kind of dialogue that 
is occurring in Cambodia, and that means that third sector organisations can embrace a truly 
‘critically reflective accountability’ (Crack, 2013, p.824). 
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